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LISTENING TO THE DISABLED:




Chantel R. was a twenty-six year old mentally retarded1 woman whom
experts identified as having the intellectual function of a seven-year-old
child2 and "no ability to think abstractly."'3 In 2003, her mother sought an
appointment as her guardian with the authority to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment.4  Chantel verbally expressed both to a psychologist at her
residential treatment facility and to the judge in court that she did not want
food or water removed even if she was permanently unconscious because
she did not "want [anything] to happen to [her]."' 5 A judge for the
Surrogate's Court of New York County disregarded Chantel's statements
based on expert testimony that Chantel could not understand the concept of
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank my
faculty advisor Professor Norton Spritz and everyone at the Mental Hygiene Legal Service,
First Department, especially Karen Gomes Andreasian. In addition, I want to extend a
special thanks to my wife, Brett A. Saarela.
1. Mental retardation is often defined as "an intellectual functioning level (as measured
by standard tests for intelligence quotient) that is well below average and significant
limitations in daily living skills (adaptive functioning)." The Gale Encyclopedia of Medicine
1911 (Donna Olendorf et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter Gale Encyclopedia]; see also Martha A.
Field & Valerie A. Sanchez, Equal Treatment for People with Mental Retardation: Having
and Raising Children 30 (1999). The retarded are categorized as borderline, mild, moderate,
severe, or profound. Id. at 33. This Note is primarily concerned with those with moderate,
severe, or profound retardation, who represent approximately ten percent of the retarded
population, but also implicitly applies to any mentally retarded persons that have been
adjudicated incompetent. Id. By implication this Note may also apply to severely and
persistently mentally ill individuals and those with developmental disabilities who have also
never been competent to make medical decisions.
2. Mental age scoring has been criticized by some advocates for the retarded as
encouraging some people, particularly judges, to see the retarded as children. Field &
Sanchez, supra note 1, at 38. An individual's adaptive skills, experience, and ability to
function can continue to increase even if mental age remains fixed. Id. Mental age is more
akin to academic age and therefore a poor proxy for actual age with its assumptions
concerning maturity. Id. at 39. The average "mental age" of the entire general population
under this metric is only sixteen. 1d. at 38. If most people are considered to be sixteen years
old, the problem of equating mental age to legal age is obvious.
3. In re Guardianship of Chantel R., 791 N.Y.S.2d 324, 326 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County
2004).
4. Id. at 325.
5. Id. at 326.
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being permanently unconscious or kept alive through artificial means.6 The
court decided that her decision was irrational and that only competent
people can make irrational decisions. 7
R.H. was a thirty-three year-old mentally retarded woman with Down's
Syndrome. 8 She lived in a state school in Massachusetts and worked four
days a week at a business collating, folding, and stuffing envelopes. 9 The
activities she enjoyed included "dancing, bowling, listening to music and
socializing with" her friends. 10 She suffered from chronic pyelonephritis
which was progressively destroying her kidneys." I Finally, in 1992 her
medical situation became serious enough to require aggressive dialysis
treatments and, ultimately, a kidney transplant. 12 Her mother opposed
initiating dialysis treatment, feeling that R.H. would not tolerate it. 13 A
probate court judge spoke with members of the family, physicians,
psychologists, and an appointed guardian ad litem, and decided not to
permit the initiation of dialysis treatment-allowing R.H. to die. 14  The
court and guardian ad litem bowed to the wishes of her family that she not
suffer the "unpleasant[ness]" of dialysis treatments which would require
three sessions a week each of three hours. 15 At no point did the probate
court judge or the guardian ad litem ask R.H. what she wanted to do. 16
Competent persons can communicate their wishes regarding end-of-life
medical decisions through advanced directives stating their preferences to
others or by designating a health care proxy to make decisions for them. 17
6. See id. at 329.
7. id.
8. In re R.H., 622 N.E.2d 1071, 1072-73 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).
9. Id. at 1073.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1072-74. Pyelonephritis is an infection of the kidney and the ducts carrying
urine from the kidneys. Gale Encyclopedia, supra note 1, at 2422.
12. R.H., 622 N.E.2d at 1074. Hemodialysis involves using filtration machinery to
cleanse a patient's bloodstream of toxins when the patient's own kidneys can no longer
fulfill that function. Id. at 1074 n.3. R.H.'s treatment would require three sessions of three
hours each every week and the surgical creation of a permanent access site into her
circulatory system. Id. at 1074.
13. Id. Two of R.H.'s physicians and the hospital dialysis director disagreed and argued
that she should receive dialysis suggesting the procedure was not overly painful and that
R.H. had a history of compliance with treatment. Id. at 1074-75. Two other physicians
concurred with the mother. Id. at 1075.
14. Id. Without treatment R.H. would be expected to die within one to three years. Id at
1074. She could survive on dialysis, even without a kidney transplant for "ten or twenty
more years." Id.
15. Id. at 1075.
16. Id. at 1077 ("The judge's findings omit entirely the issue of R.H.'s expressed
preferences regarding her illness and treatment options."). The Massachusetts Appeals
Court vacated the probate court's judgment and ordered the dialysis started immediately. Id.
at 1079-80. "[T]he judge's decision against undertaking trial dialysis is unsupported by the
evidence and clearly erroneous." Id. at 1080.
17. See, e.g., Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act §§ 2, 4 (1993), 9 U.L.A. 93, 99 (2005)
(allowing an individual to record instructions concerning her health care in the event of
incapacity); Cal. Prob. Code §§ 4650-77, 4680-90, 4700-01 (West Supp. 2006) (enabling the
designation of a health care proxy). For a list of proxy and advanced directive statutes in all
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Even if they become incompetent, their preferences will usually be
honored. 18 But persons whose competence never rose to the level required
for informed consent are in a more complex legal position. Courts have
struggled with the question of how much, if at all, they are required to
consult with never-competent patients, especially regarding decisions that
could end their lives. 19 State statutes addressing this problem are often
concerned only with the best interests of the patient and not with their
expressed interest. 20 This Note seeks to examine the jurisprudence of end-
of-life medical decision making for the never competent and specifically to
explore the role the never competent themselves play in surrogate decisions.
This Note will begin in Part I by looking at current legal doctrine for end-
of-life decision making, first for the formerly competent and then for the
never competent. The Note will examine a series of cases where courts
reacted to the verbal and nonverbal expressions of the never competent and
then examine how state statutory schemes apply to the never competent. In
Part II, the Note will survey arguments put forward by courts and
commentators regarding the extent to which surrogate decision makers have
the power to override expressed preferences of the never competent.
Finally, in Part III, this Note will propose that while never-competent
patients need empowered surrogates to protect their right to refuse
treatment, surrogates can only honor the personal autonomy of patients by
first considering any expressed preference, even if the expression does not
rise to the level of informed consent.
I. END-OF-LIFE DECISION MAKING FOR THE NEVER COMPETENT: AN
OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL, CASE LAW, AND STATUTORY SOLUTIONS
Traditionally, when a person stopped breathing and his heart stopped
beating he was dead.21  Problems arose in the 1960s when medical
interventions (particularly heart and lung machines) could keep some vital
processes going while others, such as brain function, had ended.22 Medical
technology has progressed to the point where patients can be kept "alive"
indefinitely even if permanently unconscious and unable to think, eat, or
fifty states, see Alicia R. Ouellette, When Vitalism Is Dead Wrong: The Discrimination
Against and Torture of Incompetent Patients by Compulsory Life-Sustaining Treatment, 79
Ind. L.J. 1, 3 n.7 (2004).
18. See, e.g., Cal. Prob. Code § 4683(a) ("An agent designated in the power of attorney
may make health care decisions for the principal to the same extent the principal could make
health care decisions if the principal had the capacity to do so."); see also Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 716 (1997) (recognizing state applications of living will and
proxy statutes).
19. See infra Part I.C.
20. See infra Part I.D.
21. See President's Comm'n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Med. & Biomedical &
Behavioral Research, Defining Death: Medical, Legal and Ethical Issues in the
Determination of Death 13 (1981).
22. See id. at 21-23.
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care for themselves. 23 The questions of when medical treatment should be
stopped-allowing death to occur-and who should make that decision,
have created a new area of jurisprudence over the last thirty years. 24
This part will begin with an overview of the legal doctrines regarding
end-of-life medical decision making for the formerly competent. After
briefly describing some legal definitions of competency, this part will
outline the right of informed consent, the right to privacy, and the state's
interest in preserving life by discussing some very influential early New
Jersey cases, Quinlan and Conroy, the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan,
and subsequent state court and legislative reactions to that decision. 25 This
part will then discuss state court decisions specifically focused on end-of-
life decision making for the never competent.26 The cases will be examined
to determine how courts react to the expressions of never-competent
patients. 27  Finally, this part will survey some statutory schemes and
analyze their application to never-competent persons. 28
A. Overview of the Doctrine for End-of-Life Decision Making for the
Formerly Competent
End-of-life medical decision making in the United States is based on the
principle of patient autonomy: Patients have the right to make decisions
about their own medical care. 29 The right of a person to his bodily integrity
in the absence of legally justified interference is an essential component of
the right to liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. 30 This right includes the right to refuse unwanted medical
23. See id.; see also Rasmussen ex rel. Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 678 (Ariz.
1987) ("Medical technology has effectively created a twilight zone of suspended animation
where death commences while life, in some form, continues."); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,
656 (N.J. 1976) (discussing how modem respirators can create a form of "irreversible
coma"). Technology has fundamentally transformed the way that death takes place in this
country. President's Comm'n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Med. & Biomedical &
Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forgo Life-Sustaining Treatment: Ethical, Medical and
Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions 16-18 (1983). In 1900, the leading causes of death
were still communicable diseases and the vast majority of patients died at home because
medical science could do little for them. Id. The most common treatments, alcohol and
opiates, were available without a prescription. Id By the 1980s some eighty percent of
deaths occurred in an institutional setting. Id.
24. See Barry R. Furrow et al., Health Law § 16-1 (2000).
25. See infra Part I.A.
26. See infra Part I.B.
27. See infra Part I.C.
28. See infra Part I.D.
29. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990). Anglo-
American common law supports individual autonomy by making the touching of one person
by another without consent a battery. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13 cmt. d (1979).
30. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded... than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.").
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treatment:31 "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for
which he is liable in damages."3 2 The right to refuse medical treatment
includes the right to be informed of all information necessary to make a
reasoned decision regarding medical care.33
Competency is a prerequisite for the ability to provide informed
consent.3 4 A competent patient's refusal of medical treatment must be
respected no matter how irrational.35 The law presumes competency-one
must be adjudicated incompetent.36 No generally accepted legal definition
of incompetency exists and, in practice, courts rely on the judgments of
physicians. 37  But no test or procedure is generally accepted among
physicians in determining competence.38 Physicians generally look to their
patients' ability to absorb, comprehend, and remember information; to
relate to their situation and reason through alternatives, to make and accept
a choice, and, finally, to explain the reasons for their decision.3 9
31. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279. The government's police power can override the right to
refuse unwanted medical treatment to protect public health and safety. See Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990) (recognizing that a prisoner can be involuntarily
medicated because he was dangerous to other prisoners when off medication); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26-28 (1905) (holding that the state can compel vaccination to
prevent the spread of smallpox).
32. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269 (citing Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92,
93 (N.Y. 1914) (Cardozo, J.)).
33. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App.
1957) ("A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability if he
withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the
patient to the proposed treatment.").
34. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892; Bruce J. Winick,
Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28
Hous. L. Rev. 15, 21-27 (1991).
35. See Winick, supra note 34, at 21 & n.17.
36. See id. at 22.
37. See Becky Cox White, Competence to Consent 10-11 (1994); Winick, supra note 34,
at 24-25. But see Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 344 n.7 (N.Y. 1986). The court in Rivers
suggested an eight-factor test:
(1) the person's knowledge that he has a choice to make; (2) the patient's ability to
understand the available options, their advantages and disadvantages; (3) the
patient's cognitive capacity to consider the relevant factors; (4) the absence of any
interfering pathologic perception or belief, such as a delusion concerning the
decision; (5) the absence of any interfering emotional state, such as severe manic
depression, euphoria or emotional disability; (6) the absence of any interfering
pathologic motivational pressure; (7) the absence of any interfering pathologic
relationship, such as the conviction of helpless dependency on another person; (8)
an awareness of how others view the decision, the general social attitude toward
the choices and an understanding of his reason for deviating from that attitude if he
does.
Id.
38. See White, supra note 37, at 11; D. Don Welch, Walking in Their Shoes: Paying
Respect to Incompetent Patients, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1617, 1627 (1989).
39. White, supra note 37, at 154-83; see also President's Comm'n for the Study of
Ethical Problems ir, Med. & Biomedical & Behavioral Research, Making Health Care
Decisions: The Ethical and Legal Implications of Informed Consent in the Patient-
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While conscious, competent patients had clear rights to refuse medical
treatment; thirty years ago, medical technology advanced to the point where
patients were kept alive indefinitely because they could not expressly refuse
treatment while unconscious. 40 Did surrogates have the right to refuse
medical treatment on their behalf? The Supreme Court of the State of New
Jersey said they did and based its decision not just in the common law right
of informed consent, but also in the right to privacy found in the
Constitution.4 1 In In re Quinlan, a father wanted the authority to withdraw
a respirator from his adult daughter, Karen Quinlan, who was in a
persistently vegetative state. 42 The court held that the constitutional right to
privacy protected Karen's right to refuse invasive medical treatment and
that a guardian may assert that right on her behalf.43 While the state had an
interest in preserving Karen's life, the "[s]tate's interest [in life] weakens
and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion
increases and the prognosis dims." 44
In cases subsequent to Quinlan, courts tended to move away from the
right to privacy and toward common law principles of informed consent in
cases involving the refusal of medical treatment.45 While the right to
privacy required a weighing of the patient's privacy interests against the
state's interest, the common law right of informed consent generally
outweighed any state interest.46 But, because informed consent requires a
competent choice, courts began to seek evidence of a patient's choice to
refuse life-sustaining treatment in statements made prior to incompetence. 47
The New Jersey Supreme Court applied the principle of informed
consent to surrogate decision making in In re Conroy.48 Here, the court
created a balancing test between the state's interest in preserving life and a
Practitioner Relationship 57 (1982) [hereinafter President's Commission: Consent]
(suggesting that capacity requires, "(1) possession of a set of values and goals; (2) the ability
to communicate and to understand information; and (3) the ability to reason and to deliberate
about one's choices"). For a discussion of the practice of identifying incompetency, see
infra Part II.B. 1.
40. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 310-13 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
41. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976). Quinlan is considered the "seminal"
case in the field. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270.
42. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 654. Persistent vegetative state can be defined as "a permanent
and irreversible condition of unconsciousness in which there is: (a) The absence of
voluntary action or cognitive behavior of any kind [and] (b) An inability to communicate or
interact purposefully with the environment." Fla Stat. Ann. § 765.101(12) (West 2005).
43. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664.
44. Id.
45. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 n.7 ("Although many state courts have held that a right
to refuse treatment is encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of privacy, we have
never so held. We believe this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest."); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985).
46. See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1225.
47. See id. at 1229.
48. Id. at 1223. Conroy differed from Quinlan in that it involved the removal of
nutrition and hydration from a terminally incompetent eighty-four year old woman who was
not on a respirator. Id. at 1216-19.
2894 [Vol. 74
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surrogate's interest in making decisions on behalf of a formerly competent
patient. 49  In most cases the court required evidence of a patient's
preference based on statements made prior to incompetency. 50 But, if a
terminally ill patient experienced "recurring, unavoidable and severe pain,"
a court could permit doctors to cease treatment even in the absence of any
evidence of the patient's preferences while competent if the best interests of
the patient clearly lay in ending treatment. 51 The court therefore held open
the possibility of basing an end-of-life decision not on the preferences of
the patient, but on the surrogate's or court's determination of the patient's
best interests. 52
The Supreme Court of the United States addressed the right of surrogates
to terminate life-sustaining medical care for incompetent patients in Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.53 In Cruzan, the parents
sought to remove nutrition and hydration from their daughter, Nancy, who
was in a persistently vegetative state following a car accident. 54 The Court
constitutionalized the common law right to refuse medical treatment (the
informed consent doctrine) by finding that the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause included a liberty interest in refusing medical treatment.55
Recognized state interests could, however, limit the exercise of this right by
surrogates. 56
The Supreme Court found that the state has an interest in both the process
of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment and the life of the incompetent
patient. 57 The state also has an interest in guarding against abuse of the
power to withdraw life-sustaining treatment.58 Furthermore, the state has a
basic interest in the preservation of human life. 59 To guard against abuse of
49. See id. at 1227.
50. Id. at 1229.
51. Id. at 1231-32 ("Under [a pure objective] test... the net burdens of the patient's life
with the treatment should clearly and markedly outweigh the benefits that the patient derives
from life. Further, the recurring, unavoidable and severe pain of the patient's life with the
treatment should be such that the effect of administering life-sustaining treatment would be
inhumane."); see infra 1.B.3.
52. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1231.
53. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
54. Id. at 265.
55. Id. at 278 ("The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior
decisions."); see also id. at 287-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice William Rehnquist
later sought to limit this principle in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725 (1997),
but the proposition has been consistently supported by a majority of the Justices and by
lower courts, see Blouin v. Spitzer, 356 F.3d 348, 359 (2d Cir. 2004).
56. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281-82; see also Blouin, 356 F.3d at 359 (interpreting
Cruzan as saying "it does not follow.., that an incompetent person whose death is
imminent has a constitutional right to have a surrogate make critical medical decisions,
including a decision to withdraw life support").
57. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281-82.
58. Id. at 281.
59. Id. at 282 (finding that a state can "simply assert an unqualified interest in the
preservation of human life"); see also id at 295 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that "'[t]he
life of those to whom life has become a burden-of those who are hopelessly diseased or
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surrogate power and protect human life, the Court held that Missouri was
free to establish a clear and convincing evidentiary standard and free to
require judicial proceedings for the "added guarantee of accurate
factfinding that the adversary process brings with it."'60
While the Court in Cruzan left the broad outlines of legal doctrine on
end-of-life medical decision making to the "laboratory of the states," 61
several themes emerged from the decision, particularly the presumption in
favor of preserving life. 62 While a court may require clear and convincing
evidence that an individual would not want life-sustaining treatment to
continue, there is no such requirement for proving a patient would prefer to
continue such treatment.63 While most states require clear and convincing
evidence that an individual would not want treatment sustained,64 in
practice the burden of showing clear and convincing evidence is applied
differently from state to state. 65
State legislatures assist individuals in making end-of-life medical
decisions by enacting statutes permitting living wills and health care
proxies. 66 A living will is a writing by a patient outlining their preferences
regarding end-of-life treatment.67 A health care proxy is a form appointing
a surrogate decision maker for medical decisions in the event the executor
fatally wounded-nay, even the lives of criminals condemned to death, are under the
protection of the law, equally as the lives of those who are in the full tide of life's enjoyment,
and anxious to continue to live' (quoting Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146, 163 (1873))).
60. Id. at 281.
61. Id. at 292.
62. See id. at 283; see also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1233 (N.J. 1985) ("When
evidence of a person's wishes ... is equivocal, it is best to err, if at all, in favor of preserving
life.").
63. See In re KI., 735 A.2d 448, 456 (D.C. 1999) (requiring clear and convincing
evidence that ending treatment is in a patient's best interest); Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1232
("[E]ven in the context of severe pain, life-sustaining treatment should not be withdrawn
from an incompetent patient who had previously expressed a wish to be kept alive."). But see
Norman L. Cantor, Making Medical Decisions for the Profoundly Mentally Disabled 118-25
(2005) (arguing that permanent unconsciousness is an intrinsically undignified state for any
human being and therefore individuals should have to actively choose to be maintained in
that state).
64. See In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 441 (N.J. 1987); Furrow et al., supra note 24, § 16-
52(a).
65. Compare Jobes, 529 A.2d at 441 (finding that evidence meets the burden when it
"produce[s] in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the
allegations sought to be established"), with In re O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y.
1988) (requiring "proof sufficient to persuade the trier of fact that the patient held a firm and
settled commitment to the termination of life supports under the circumstances like those
presented," and the court must be convinced "as far as is humanly possible" that the
strengths of those beliefs make a "change of heart unlikely"). Two states besides New York
have high evidentiary burdens: Missouri and Michigan. See In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399,
410 (Mich. 1995); In re Warren, 858 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
66. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 716 (1997). For an exhaustive list of
state statutes in this area, see Ouellette, supra note 17, at 3 n.7.
67. Furrow et al., supra note 24, § 16-21; see also Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act §
1(1) (1993), 9 U.L.A. 88 (2005) (referring to a living will as an "advance health-care
directive").
[Vol. 742896
LISTENING TO THE DISABLED
becomes incompetent. 68 It functions as a simplified power of attorney and
can include written instructions regarding the patient's preferences. 69
These documents generally enable individuals to overcome evidentiary
burdens and permit surrogates to decline treatment without judicial
intervention. 70 Health care proxies are now the preferred method because
living wills cannot usually anticipate the exact circumstances in which
future decisions must be made. 71
B. Court Decisions Addressing End-of-Life Decision Making for the Never
Competent
A substantial portion of the jurisprudence of end-of-life decision making
focuses on determining what the person's expressed wishes were while
competent. 72 This creates obvious problems in the case of the moderately
or severely retarded or persistently mentally ill who may never have had the
competence to exercise informed consent. 73 The two traditional doctrines
in this area are: (1) substitute judgment-which seeks to ascertain what the
patient would have wanted were he actually competent, 74 and (2) the best
interest doctrine-where a surrogate attempts to determine what the best
course of action is for the patient in his situation.75 In practice, these two
68. See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 2981-85 (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2006).
69. See, e.g., Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act § 4, 9 U.L.A. 99-104 (showing a sample
form).
70. See O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 613-14.
71. See President's Council on Bioethics, Taking Care: Ethical Caregiving in our Aging
Society 81-91 (2005). The basic hypothetical situation involves an individual with a living
will indicating that he does not wish to be kept alive if he cannot enjoy his normal activities
and is dependent on other people. Subsequently, he develops dementia. While not able to
engage in his former activities and dependent on others, the demented individual can, in fact,
be very happy and contented with life, often happier than he was while competent. If the
person gets a treatable illness can a health-care provider really refuse treatment in
accordance with his living will? Id.; see also Rebecca Dresser, Missing Persons: Legal
Perceptions of Incompetent Patients, 46 Rutgers L. Rev. 609, 624-27 (1994).
72. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1990).
73. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 430-31
(Mass. 1977).
74. Id.; see also In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 722-23 (Ga. 1984); In re Conservatorship
of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 341 (Minn. 1984); In re Guardianship of Ingram, 689 P.2d 1363,
1372 (Wash. 1984). The origins of the substitute judgment doctrine trace back to 1816 when
an English court allowed an incompetent person to grant an allowance to a relative. The
court reasoned that it should make the lunatic act "as... the [1]unatic himself would have
acted if of sound mind." Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 431 (citing Ex parte Whitbread in re
Hinde, a Lunatic, (1816) 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch.)). Only Massachusetts and Washington
state courts have applied the substitute judgment doctrine to end-of-life medical decision
making for never-competent adult patients. Id. at 430-31; Ingram, 689 P.2d at 1372. Other
states have applied the substitute judgment doctrine in cases involving formerly competent
patients without ascertainable wishes regarding end-of-life decisions. See Torres, 357
N.W.2d at 341. Some have applied it to decision making on behalf of infants. See L.H.R.,
321 S.E.2d at 722-23.
75. In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 481-83 (N.J. 1981); see also In re K.I., 735 A.2d 448,
450 (D.C. 1999); In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 70 (Wis. 1992). The best interest doctrine is
rooted in the Anglo-American tradition of the sovereign's authority to protect helpless
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doctrines are very closely entwined and often interchangeable.7 6 Court
decisions broadly look to both subjective and objective standards in
determining what course of action is best for patients facing end-of-life
decisions.77
1. Substitute Judgment Doctrine
The substitute judgment standard requires a surrogate to determine what
the incompetent individual would want to do if competent.78 The leading
case on the application of substitute judgment to never-competent patients
is Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz.79
Joseph Saikewicz was a profoundly retarded, nonverbally communicative
sixty-seven year old man with an IQ of 10.80 Diagnosed with leukemia, he
was given a thirty to fifty percent chance of remission for two to thirteen
months if he underwent chemotherapy.81 Without treatment he would die
in a "matter of weeks or, perhaps, several months," but his death would not
be painful. 82 The problem arose in the lower court, because, while most
competent people would normally choose the therapy, doctors would
probably have to restrain Saikewicz for extended periods to allow a painful
course of chemotherapy. 83
The court reasoned that under an objective, "best interest" standard, as
typically applied to never-competent individuals, treatment would be
compelled for Saikewicz because that is what most competent patients
would have chosen.84 However, the court rebelled against applying the
standard of a competent patient to Saikewicz because "significant decisions
of life are more complex than statistical determinations." 85  Unlike a
populations, also known as parens patriae power. See Grady, 426 A.2d at 479 (describing
parens patriae power as "the inherent equitable authority of the sovereign to protect those
persons within the state who cannot protect themselves because of an innate legal
disability"). The watchword for exercising parens patriae power is the best interests of the
incompetent person because the purpose of the government's power is protection. See In re
Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, 408 (Mich. 1995); Grady, 426 A.2d at 479-80; L. W., 482 N.W.2d
at 70, 71; see also K.I., 735 A.2d at 461-62; Norman L. Cantor, The Bane of Surrogate
Decision-Making: Defining the Best Interests of Never-Competent Persons, 26 J. Legal
Med. 155 (2005).
76. See Cantor, supra note 63, at 105 (arguing that even when courts are nominally
applying a substitute judgment standard they use a best interest standard because "there is no
basis for ascribing a personal choice ... among competing values and interests... to a
profoundly disabled person").
77. See Martin, 538 N.W.2d at 408.
78. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 430-31
(Mass. 1977); see also In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1249-50 (D.C. 1990).
79. 370 N.E.2d 417.
80. Id. at 420. He was given a mental age of two years and eight months. Id. For a
discussion of mental age scoring, see supra note 2.
81. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 420.
82. Id. at 421. Saikewicz died on September 4, 1976, four months after the original
probate judge ordered that no treatment be administered. Id. at 422.
83. Id. at 420-21.
84. Id. at 427-28.
85. Id. at 428.
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competent person, Saikewicz's inability to understand the reason for the
pain involved in chemotherapy would create tremendous fear and disruption
in his life.86 He would not have the understanding from which competent
patients draw strength. 87 While substitute judgment required a court to
force Saikewicz to choose as if competent, it also required the court to
assume Saikewicz would take into account the fact of his incompetence in
reaching the decision. 88
2. Best Interest Doctrine
An alternative to the majority standard-substitute judgment-is the best
interest doctrine, wherein the court tries to find the course of action which
produces the greatest net benefit to the incompetent person.89 The leading
case on the application of the best interest standard in medical decision
making for never-competent patients is the New Jersey Supreme Court
case, In re Grady.90
In Grady, parents wanted to sterilize their twenty-year-old daughter, Lee
Ann, who had Down's Syndrome, to allow her to live more independently
from her family in a group home. 91 Lee Ann could not consent to
sterilization because "Lee Ann herself [could] comprehend neither the
problem nor the proposed solution." 92 The court found that Lee Ann had a
right to privacy interest in controlling her reproductive choices, but found
that the interest was valueless unless it could be exercised by a surrogate.93
The court required, and found, clear and convincing evidence that
sterilization was in Lee Ann's best interest, specifically that "the proponents
of sterilization [were] seeking it in good faith and that their primary concern
is for the best interests of the incompetent person rather than their own or
the public's convenience." 94
The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected considerations outside the direct
interests of the never-competent person. 95 Specifically, the court rejected
an application of a state interest in preventing the birth of "genetically
86. Id. at 432.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 431-32 ("[T]he decision in cases such as this should be that which would be
made by the incompetent person, if that person were competent, but taking into account the
present and future incompetency of the individual as one of the factors which would
necessarily enter into the decision making process of the competent person.").
89. See In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 482 (N.J. 1981); see also Cantor, supra note 75
(discussing what factors should go into making a best interest determination). Most courts
restrict the application of substitute judgment to cases where the individual was once
competent and therefore evidence can be found as to the person's subjective preferences. See
In re K.I., 735 A.2d 448, 455 (D.C. 1999).
90. Grady, 426 A.2d 467.
91. Id. at 470.
92. Id. at 473. For an excellent discussion of child-rearing by the mentally retarded, see
Field & Sanchez, supra note 1.
93. Grady, 426 A.2d at 474-75.
94. Id. at 483.
95. See id. at 481.
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defective" children or not allowing never-competent persons to become
parents. 96 Surrogates only have authority when acting in the best interests
of the never competent, not when acting in their own interests or society at
large. 97 Applying this best interest standard to end-of-life decisions for
never-competent persons, courts essentially ask whether the burdens of
continued treatment outweigh the potential benefit.98
Because the state is either functioning as the ward's guardian or
supervising the ward's guardian, the principles of guardianship also bind
the state to determine what is in the best interests of the ward.99 However,
wide variation exists in deciding what factors to consider in a best interests
calculation.100
96. Id. There is a long history in the United States and abroad of attempts to eliminate
"genetically defective" persons by preventing them from having children. See Buck v. Bell,
274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) ("It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent
those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind."); see also Shoshana K. Kehoe,
Giving the Disabled and Terminally Ill a Voice: Mandating Mediation for All Physician-
Assisted Suicide, Withdrawal of Life Support, or Life-Sustaining Treatment Requests, 20
Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 373, 378-82 (1999) (surveying the history of the eugenics
movement in the United States and Germany).
97. Grady, 426 A.2d at 483.
98. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (N.J. 1985) ("By [the burdens test] we mean
that the patient is suffering, and will continue to suffer throughout the expected duration of
his life, unavoidable pain, and that the net burdens of his prolonged life (the pain and
suffering of his life with the treatment less the amount and duration of pain that the patient
would likely experience if the treatment were withdrawn) markedly outweigh any physical
pleasure, emotional enjoyment, or intellectual satisfaction that the patient may still be able to
derive from life."); In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 68 (Wis. 1992) ("A
dignified and natural death may outweigh the interest of maintaining a physiological life as
long as medically possible.").
99. See Grady, 426 A.2d at 481-84. It is important to distinguish between the terms
"surrogate" and "guardian." A surrogate is any individual making a decision for another. A
guardian is a deputized surrogate who receives their decision making power from a court.
See, e.g., N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 81.03(a) (McKinney Supp. 2006) (defining guardian as
"a person ... appointed in accordance with terms of this article by the [court] ... to act on
behalf of an incapacitated person in providing for personal needs and/or for property
management"). States typically do not require court action before a surrogate can make
medical decisions for an incompetent person. See In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 44 (Ind.
1991). In situations where there is some dispute over who can act for the best interests of an
incompetent person, guardianship proceedings are usually undertaken. In the case of end-of-
life decision making for never-competent adults they are often required. See N.Y. Surr. Ct.
Proc. Act § 1750-b (McKinney Supp. 2006).
100. See, e.g., Cantor, supra note 75, at 156. One definition of best interests can be found
in N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 80.03(d) (McKinney Supp. 2006). The statute reads as follows:
[P]romoting personal well-being by the assessment of the risks, benefits and
alternatives to the patient of a proposed major medical treatment, taking into
account factors including the relief of suffering, the preservation or restoration of
functioning, improvement in the quality of the patient's life with and without the
proposed major medical treatment and consistency with the personal beliefs and
values known to be held by the patient.
Id.; see also Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. § 5-601(e) (West 2005) (defining best interests as
"the benefits to the individual resulting from a treatment outweigh the burdens to the
individual resulting from that treatment" with factors including the effect of treatment, level
of pain, "extreme humiliation and dependency," life expectancy, prognosis, side effects, and
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3. Beyond Traditional Doctrine: Subjective Versus Objective Standards
The traditional categories of substitute judgment and best interests are
often not very well differentiated. 10 1  When applying the substitute
judgment doctrine to never-competent patients, courts basically assume that
a never-competent patient, if competent, would choose what is in their best
interests. 102 When courts apply the best interest standard, they are never
truly applying a completely objective approach because they consider the
best interests of the patient including concerns specific to the patient and
their situation. 10 3 A more meaningful distinction is between objective
standards outside the person (i.e., what other people do or what medical
professionals prefer) and standards subjective to the person (what this
person herself wants).104
The Supreme Court for the State of Michigan issued an opinion
illustrating the distinction between objective and subjective standards in In
re Martin.10 5 Michael Martin suffered a head injury in a car accident but
was not unconscious or in a persistent vegetative state. 10 6 Although doctors
found him to have a limited ability to interact with others and respond to
simple commands, he could not feed or care for himself.10 7 Michael's wife
asserted that he would never wish to be kept alive in his present condition
and sought to have a feeding tube removed over the objection of his mother
and sister. 10 8 The lower court found clear and convincing evidence that
Michael would refuse medical treatment under these circumstances, but the
Supreme Court of Michigan reversed. 109
The Michigan court associated the best interest standard with an
objective standard and the substitute judgment standard with a subjective
standard:
"religious beliefs and basic values" of the individual); Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act §
2(e) cmt. (1993), 9 U.L.A. 94, 95 (2005) ("In determining the principal's best interest, the
agent is to consider the principal's personal values to the extent known to the agent. The Act
does not prescribe a detailed list of factors for determining the principal's best interest but
instead grants the agent discretion to ascertain and weigh the factors likely to be of
importance to the principal.").
101. See Care & Protection of Beth, 587 N.E.2d 1377, 1381 n.ll (Mass. 1992) ("It is true
that, when applying the 'best interests' test, the inquiry is essentially objective in nature, and
the decisions are made not by, but on behalf of, the child.... Nevertheless, the best interests
analysis, like that of the substituted judgment doctrine, requires a court to focus on the
various factors unique to the situation of the individual for whom it must act .... As a
practical matter, the criteria to be examined and the basic applicable reasoning are the
same."); see also Cantor, supra note 63, at 158-59.
102. SeeBeth,587N.E.2dat 1381 &n.11.
103. Seeid.
104. In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, 408 (Mich. 1995) ("The subjective standard is based
on a patient's right to self-determination, while the objective standard is grounded in the
state's parens patriae power.").
105. 538 N.W.2d 399.
106. Id. at 402-03.
107. Id. at 403.
108. Id. at 402.
109. Id. at 401-02.
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The best interest standard is an objective analysis under which the
benefits and burdens to the patient of treatment are assessed by the
surrogate in conjunction with any statements made by the patient if such
statements are available ... best interest analysis is generally invoked, if
at all, only as a secondary approach when subjective evidence of a
particular patient's decision is lacking because it involves a qualitative
assessment of the patient's condition, a decision the state may legitimately
decline to make....
The substitute judgment standard has subjective and objective
components... [A] surrogate attempts to ascertain, with as much
specificity as possible, the decision the incompetent patient would make if
he were competent to do so .... [W]here there is no explicit evidence...
the surrogate may still decide to terminate treatment on the basis of
evidence of the patient's "value system."' 1 10
The court applied Michigan's stricter evidentiary standards, particularly
in refusing to accept statements made in response to another person's death
when that person's medical condition differed substantially from Michael's
present condition. As a result, the court held that the wife did not meet a
clear and convincing standard.11 1  Because Michael was at one point
competent, it was only in dicta that the court considered testimony from
doctors that Michael, although incompetent, presently seemed content with
his situation. 112 While courts apply subjective standards to persons that
were once competent, they often apply an objective best interest analysis to
the never competent. The extent to which the courts consider the subjective
expressions of the never competent varies widely.
C. Listening to the Incompetent: What Are the Courts Hearing?
This section will analyze a series of representative cases where courts
consider the expressed statements and actions of the never competent in
evaluating whether to discontinue medical treatment. In all the following
cases the individual has been adjudicated incompetent. But that does not
mean the individuals have not expressed opinions or preferences, just that
those opinions and preferences do not rise to the level of informed consent
required for medical decision making. Expressions commonly asserted by
incompetent patients include pushing against restraints, noncooperation
with treatment, verbalization, and actively trying to remove
nutrition/hydration tubes. 113  The question becomes: What weight are
surrogates (and by extension, courts) to grant these expressions? Are they
gestures of frustration or do they indicate subjective preferences?
110. Id. at 407 (citations omitted).
111. Id. at411.
112. Id. at412-13.
113. See infra Part I.C.1-3.
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1. Physical Resistance and Noncooperation: Saikewicz and Storar
The court in Saikewicz, in refusing to permit treatment, did look at the
patient's presumed physical resistance to the intravenous administration of
chemotherapy drugs as a complicating factor in the treatment but did not
consider evidence of his subjective preference for treatment or
nontreatment. 1 14 Saikewicz was a very strong and "well-built" sixty-seven
year old man, and his lack of cooperation with treatment would have
required him to be restrained for twelve to twenty-four hour periods of
time. 115 Like the lower probate court, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
considered his noncooperation with treatment as one of six factors weighing
against treatment.1 16 The concern was not that resistance indicated his
preference to refuse treatment but the effects of the restraints themselves." 7
Saikewicz would suffer fear of being restrained, and his noncooperation
increased the risk of medical complications from chemotherapy drugs. 118
The court substituted its judgment for Saikewicz's by trying to anticipate
his personal reaction to the experience of chemotherapy, but the court did
not consider any physical expression of Saikewicz's will prior to or at the
start of treatment.] 19
While the court was very concerned with the subjective desires of
Saikewicz in coming to a substitute judgment of his preferences, it never
considered his physical resistance to treatment as evidence in itself of
subjective preference to refuse treatment. 120 In effect, the court entirely
abstracted Saikewicz, separating his moral presence from his physical
expressions. The court cited a commentator as suggesting that, were
Saikewicz to miraculously become competent, he would consider himself
"fairly treated" by the court. 121 The court determined that Saikewicz was
unable to cooperate with the treatment due to his profound retardation and
so that even if the "competent Saikewicz" preferred treatment, he would
still resist it. 122
In contrast to Saikewicz, the Court of Appeals for the State of New York,
in In re Storar, ordered John Storar to undergo treatment in the face of
opposition by his guardian and despite his physical resistance to
114. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 432 (Mass.
1977).
115. Id. at420, 421 n.5.
116. Id. at 432 (outlining six factors: (1) Saikewicz's age; (2) side effects of treatment;
(3) probability of remission; (4) immediate suffering from the treatment; (5) Saikewicz's
inability to cooperate with treatment; and (6) quality of life following successful treatment).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 430.
120. Id. at 430-32.
121. Id. at 430 n. 15 (citing John A. Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the
Substitute Judgment Doctrine, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 48, 63 (1976)).
122. Id. at421.
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treatment. 123 Storar was a profoundly retarded fifty-two year old man who
required blood transfusions following a diagnosis of inoperable bladder
cancer. 124  Storar found the transfusions "disagreeable" and physically
resisted to the extent that he required sedation prior to treatment.
125
Storar's guardian (his mother) saw his dislike of the transfusions as
evidence of his subjective preference not to have them and, on that basis,
sought to have them stopped.' 2 6 When the facility where he lived applied
to the courts for permission to continue the transfusions, they were denied
by the lower courts but won an appeal to New York's highest court.
127
The Court of Appeals found Storar's dislike of the transfusions
unremarkable and looked to the kinds of physical activities that he engaged
in as evidence that the transfusions maintained him at his normal level of
activity. 128 Prior to the transfusions his slow loss of blood made him
increasingly lethargic. 129 Following the transfusions he had more energy
and "was able to resume most of his usual activities-feeding himself,
showering, taking walks and running-including some mischievous ones,
such as stealing cigarette butts and attempting to eat them."' 30 Therefore,
the court saw the transfusions as analogous to food and asserted they "did
not involve excessive pain."' 31  While Storar's physical activity was
indirect evidence of his preference to live, the court found little relevance in
his physical resistance to treatment.132
Similarly to Saikewicz, Storar's resistance to treatment was a natural
result of his incompetence: "Of course, John Storar did not like [the
transfusions], as might be expected of one with an infant's mentality. 1 33
But, unlike Saikewicz, the court in Storar looked to the patient's increased
activity level following the treatments as evidence of his desire to keep
living. 134 More importantly, the Court of Appeals directly analogized
Storar's situation with that of a child, and held that since parents were not
permitted to deny a child life-saving treatment, the court could not do so
here. 135 Essentially, the court determined that its role required protecting
Storar's life from the decision of his mother to refuse medical treatment. 136
123. In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981). Storar has been read as prohibiting any
refusal of life-saving treatment to never-competent patients. See Blouin v. Spitzer, 213 F.
Supp. 2d 184, 192 (N.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd356 F.3d 348, 364 (2d Cir. 2004).
124. Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 68-69.
125. Id. at 69.
126. Id. at 70.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 73.
129. Id. at 69.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 73 (footnote omitted).
132. Id.
133. ld.
134. Id. at 69.
135. id. at 73 ("Mentally John Storar was an infant and that is the only realistic way to
assess his rights in this litigation.").
136. See id. at 73.
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2. Pulling at Tubes: Hier and O'Brien
Mary Hier was a ninety-two year old woman with mental illness and an
obstructed esophagus who had a surgically implanted abdominal feeding
tube to provide her with nutrition. 137 Hier repeatedly pulled out the feeding
tube. 138 Reinsertion, unless performed promptly, required surgery. 139 Two
of three doctors did not want to perform the surgery after she had pulled out
the tube several times in one week, 140 and the lower court agreed. 14 1 Hier
could not speak, but she could gesture and shake her head no.142 The court
gave great weight to her expressions of opposition, even though she was
incompetent. 143  Applying the substitute judgment doctrine "focuses
attention on, and requires giving weight to, the subjective wishes of the
incompetent patient."'144
In contrast, a New York Court in In re O'Brien145 refused to see the
pulling out of a naso-gastric tube as evidence of a subjective refusal of
treatment. 146 Thomas O'Brien was an eighty-three year old formerly
competent priest disabled by a stroke which left him bedridden,
incompetent, and incapable of speech. 147 While O'Brien was a formerly
competent person, the court made no finding of any wishes made while
competent and so analyzed the case from the same perspective as a never-
competent patient. 148 After he attempted to pull out a naso-gastric feeding
tube at least fifteen times, he expressed irritation at the abdominal tube
inserted to replace it. 149 However, the court did not see these actions as
evidence of a desire to refuse treatment. 150 "This court is not prepared to
order discontinuance of this life support based upon gestures of irritation or
137. In re Hier, 464 N.E.2d 959, 960 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984) (finding that Hier suffered




140. Id. at 961.
141. Id. at 960.
142. Id. at 961 n.3.
143. Id. at 965 ("[H]er opposition to surgery all may be seen as a plea for privacy and
personal dignity by a ninety-two year old person who is seriously ill and for whom life has
little left to offer.").
144. Id. A contrasting story is put forward by George Annas who reported that Hier was
in fact fully conscious, and merely lonely and dissatisfied with her new surroundings. Annas
reported that Hier regularly stole food from other patients, that she derived substantial
satisfaction from life (she believed she was the Queen of England), and that one of the
physicians who recommended against the surgery stated that he felt Hier had consumed
enough of the state's resources. Dresser, supra note 71, at 655-56 (citing George J. Annas,
The Case of Mary Hier: When Substituted Judgment Becomes Sleight of Hand, Hastings Ctr.
Rep., Aug 1984, at 23-25).
145. 517 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1986).
146. Id. at 348.
147. Id. at 346-47.
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annoyance.... Pain, humiliation and indignity do not of themselves
warrant the cessation of life."' 151
In these two cases similar expressions on the part of the incompetent
persons elicited opposite reactions based primarily on quality of life
considerations. The Hier court considered the patient's resistance and saw
that as justification for refusing treatment. 152 In contrast, the New York
court set the bar very high for an expression refusing treatment. 15 3 Where
the Massachusetts court valued dignity over the preservation of life, 154 the
New York court put first the interest of the state in preserving the life of the
incompetent. 155 Both views directly affected how the courts ultimately
viewed the patients' expressions.
3. Verbal Objections: Ingram
Opal Ingram was a sixty-six year old woman with dementia who was
unable to care for herself but was "alert, [had] fluent speech, and for the
most part [was] goal directed."'1 56 She held the unswerving belief that her
throat cancer was caused by a bad heater in her apartment. 157 She faced
three treatment options: without treatment she would die within six to
eighteen months by strangulation; with radiation therapy she had about a
forty percent chance of survival; with throat surgery her survival chance
rose to between seventy and eighty percent. 158 Unfortunately, the surgery
would have the side effect of removing her voice.159 Ingram repeatedly
expressed opposition to surgery for that reason. 160 While the trial court
ordered surgery, the Supreme Court for the State of Washington reversed
and Ingram received radiation treatment.161
The Washington Supreme Court applied a substitute judgment standard
and considered all the factors outlined in Saikewicz but added an additional
consideration: the patient's expressed wishes.162 "[T]he ward's expressed
wishes must be given substantial weight, even if made while the ward is
incompetent.... [H]er opposition to the surgery must be regarded as a
strong indicator of what treatment she would choose if competent to do
so." 1 63  Furthermore, the court must judge the weight of her statements
based on how well she understands the problem and choices she faces. 164
151. Id. at 348.
152. See In re Hier, 464 N.E.2d 959, 965 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984).
153. See O'Brien, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 348.
154. See Hier, 464 N.E.2d at 965.
155. See O'Brien, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 348.
156. In re Guardianship of Ingram, 689 P.2d 1363, 1364 (Wash. 1984).
157. Id. at 1365.
158. Id. at 1366.
159. Id. at 1365.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1364.
162. Id. at 1370.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1371.
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The intensity of her preference was also a factor in the court's refusal to
order the surgery. 165
The obvious difference between Ingram and the other cases in this
section is that Ingram was able to speak. While incompetent, her ability to
verbally express her preferences directly to the court gave those preferences
more power than the silent physical expressions in Saikewicz, Storar, Hier,
and O'Brien. It was also relevant that the court found her preference to
refuse a treatment which would render her mute to be understandable. 166 In
Ingram, the individual's personal autonomy was elevated above her strictly
objective best interests and the state's interest in preserving her life. 167
D. Statutory Solutions
Sheila Pouliot was a forty-two year old, profoundly retarded woman
dependent on others for all basic functions and admitted to the hospital for
gastrointestinal bleeding. 168  Pouliot's guardian asked physicians to
withhold nutrition, hydration, and antibiotics. 169  The hospital ethics
committee decided to provide only palliative care, but then sought legal
advice from New York's Attorney General. 170 The Attorney General's
Office said that New York law requires clear and convincing evidence of a
patient's previously expressed wishes before withholding life-saving
treatment. 171 Because Pouliot was never competent, there was no clear and
convincing evidence of Pouliot's wishes and so the burden was impossible
to reach. Therefore, New York law did not authorize anyone to withdraw
artificial hydration and nutrition from the never competent. 172  A
compromise to provide only artificial hydration resulted in two months of
continuing deterioration. 173  Finally, a series of court moves allowed
hydration to be withdrawn pending an appeals court hearing, and Pouliot
died three days later. 174
165. Id.
166. See id. at 1370.
167. See id. at 1371-72.
168. Blouin v. Spitzer, 213 F. Supp. 2d 184, 186 (N.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd 356 F.3d 348,
352 (2d Cir. 2004). An extensive discussion and analysis of this case, including substantial
medical information not contained in the court record, can be found in Ouellette, supra note
17, at 13-21.
169. Blouin, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 192 (citing In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981)).
172. Id. at 192-93.
173. Id. at 187; see also Ouellette, supra note 17, at 16-17. She spent the last two months
of her life curled up in a fetal position; her physician believed she was in significant pain.
According to her physician's progress notes, hydration only allowed Pouliot to be kept alive
for her body to "consume/eat itself." Id.
174. Blouin, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 186; see also Ouellette, supra note 17, at 17-18 (noting
that the judge who issued the order to end hydration acknowledged that New York law did
not permit the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment but said, "There's the law, and there's
what's right").
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Public outrage over the Attorney General's interference in the case led
the New York State Legislature to pass the Health Care Decisions Act. 175
The law permits legally appointed guardians for the mentally retarded to
have decision-making power that includes end-of-life decisions. 176 They
must be based on the patient's best interests and, "when reasonably known
or ascertainable with reasonable diligence, on the mentally retarded
person's wishes, including moral and religious beliefs."'177 Even after the
guardian has been granted the power, a complicated process follows,
including having multiple physicians confirm incapacity, and notification
provisions for state agencies.178 The medical condition must be terminal or
permanently unconscious, or an irreversible condition that imposes an
"extraordinary burden" on a person in light of retardation and expected
outcome. 179 The statute adopts a best interest standard for never-competent
patients in New York.
Only New York's statute specifically addresses a never-competent
population. 180 End-of-life decision making for the never competent in other
states often requires analogizing to formerly competent patients who have
left no instructions regarding their preferences and made no reliable
statements while competent. 181 Except for Michigan 182 and Missouri, 183 all
175. Health Care Decisions Act (HCDA), ch. 500, 2002 N.Y. Sess. Laws 105
(McKinney) (codified at N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act §§ 1750, 1750-b (McKinney Supp. 2006));
see also Ouellette, supra note 17, at 18. Prior to the HCDA, New York statutes that
permitted guardians to make medical decisions for the retarded specifically excluded the
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 80.03(a) (McKinney Supp.
2005). The HCDA should not be confused with the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act
("UHCDA"), which does not apply specifically to the never competent. See infra notes 193-
98 and accompanying text.
176. N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 1750-b(l) (providing that decisions a court-authorized
guardian can make "may include decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
treatment"). There is some current legal controversy as to whether the statute grants
guardians who were appointed prior to the statute's passage power over end-of-life decision
making or whether older guardians need to have their authority reexamined and expanded by
new court action. See In re M.B., 797 N.Y.S.2d 510 (App. Div. 2005) (denying guardians
appointed prior to the statute's effective date from making end-of-life decisions). In 2005,
the legislature extended the statute to include incompetent developmentally disabled persons
with mental capacities equivalent to the retarded. Act of Oct. 18, 2005, ch. 744, 2005 N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1723 (McKinney).
177. N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 1750-b(2)(a). But see In re Guardianship of Chantel R.,
791 N.Y.S.2d 324, 325, 329 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 2004); supra Introduction.
178. N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 1750-b(4).
179. Id. § 1750-b(4)(b)(ii).
180. Id. § 1750. New York's statute only addresses the severely mentally retarded and
developmentally disabled, and, presumably, would not apply to the persistently mentally ill.
181. See Ouellette, supra note 17, at 7-9.
182. In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, 411 (Mich. 1995). While Martin held that evidence
of a person's statements while competent was necessary for terminating life-sustaining
treatment, it stated in dicta that this rule may not apply to patients in persistent vegetative
states or in severe pain. Id. at 408 n.15.
183. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424-27 (Mo. 1988), aff'd, 497 U.S. 261
(1990). Some Missouri intermediate-level courts have held that the limitation only applies to
artificial nutrition/hydration. See, e.g., In re Warren, 858 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that surrogates can issue do-not-resuscitate orders if in the patient's best interest).
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states have some statutory or judicial provision for terminating medical
treatment for patients who have not expressed a preference while
competent. 184  Wisconsin 18 and Hawaii 186 restrict the withdrawal of
nutrition and hydration to permanently unconscious patients when those
patients have no preferences expressed while competent.
Other state statutes generally permit surrogates to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment from the never competent with some exceptions for
institutional guardians 187 or children. 188  While these statutes do not
specifically address the never competent, they apply them by analogy to the
formerly competent who leave no instructions. 189 Many states require the
surrogate to go through a series of procedures, generally including review
of the case from multiple physicians. 190 A few require that the patient be
permanently unconscious or terminally ill. 191 Some require the surrogate to
be a court-appointed guardian. 192 Generally, many state statutes follow the
principles outlined in the influential Uniform Health Care Decisions Act of
1993 ("UHCDA") which the National Conference of Commissioners of
Uniform State Laws wrote in reaction to the Cruzan decision. 193
184. See Ouellette, supra note 17, at 21-29.
185. See In re Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485, 486 (Wis. 1997) (holding that a "guardian
may only direct the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment, including nutrition and
hydration, if the incompetent ward is in a persistent vegetative state and the decision to
withdraw is in the best interests of the ward").
186. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 327E-5(g) (Supp. 2004) ("[A]rtificial nutrition and hydration may
be withheld.., only when [physicians] certify... [that] the patient is highly unlikely to
have any neurological response in the future.").
187. Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-211(9) (Supp. 2005) ("A surrogate may not be an owner,
operator, or employee of a residential long-term health-care institution at which the patient is
receiving care unless related to the patient by blood, marriage, or adoption, except in the case
of a patient of a state-operated facility who has no person listed in subsection (2) reasonably
available to act as a surrogate.").
188. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-1107(1) (2005) (requiring an individual be
eighteen years or older before medical services can be terminated). For an excellent
overview of statutes on surrogate end-of-life decision making, see Ouellette, supra note 17,
at 48-55.
189. See Ouellette, supra note 17, at 7-8.
190. See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 144A.7 (West 2005); N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 1750-
b(4)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2006).
191. See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 327E-5(g) ("[A]rtificial nutrition and hydration may be
withheld... only when [physicians] certify ... [that] the patient is highly unlikely to have
any neurological response in the future."); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2133.09(C)(2)(a)
(LexisNexis 2002) (requiring the patient to be in a permanently unconscious state for at least
a year).
192. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-3231 (2003) (stating that a surrogate may not
direct a physician to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining nutrition or hydration, unless the
surrogate is the patient's agent or guardian); N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 1750-b(1); Vt. Star.
Ann. tit. 14, §§ 3069(5), 3075 (2002).
193. Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act (1993), 9 U.L.A. 83 (2005). While the UHCDA
has only been enacted by eight states (Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine,
Mississippi, New Mexico, and Wyoming), its provisions are still generally typical of state
statutory schemes. See Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Health-Care
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The UHCDA permits competent individuals to appoint agents through a
written advanced directive which would include instructions on the writer's
preferences regarding end-of-life medical decisions. 194 The agent could
make decisions for the incompetent patient without court action.195 In the
absence of a directive, the UHCDA grants surrogate decision-making power
to a family member or close friend in the order of listed preference. 196
These decisions are made under a best interest standard with the surrogate
required to consider any known information regarding the incompetent's
values. 197 Decisions can be made without judicial approval, and the
UHCDA imposes no limitation on making end-of-life decisions.198
In many states, therefore, surrogates have wide-ranging powers to act in
making end-of-life decisions for never-competent individuals without court
intervention. The next part outlines arguments regarding the powers these
surrogates should have in end-of-life medical decisions, particularly in
cases where they may be overriding a person's expressed preference for or
against treatment.
II. COMPETING VISIONS OF THE PROBLEM: ARGUMENTS FOR STRONG AND
WEAK SURROGATE DECISION MAKERS
Decisions regarding end-of-life care are ultimately made for the never
competent by surrogate decision makers, whether they are relatives, legally
appointed guardians, or guardians ad litem. 199 Overriding the expressed
preferences of the never competent in such matters as financial planning or
routine medical procedures may be indicated by the need to protect the
interests of the never competent.200 However, when the decision involves
an end-of-life medical decision that could result in the never competent's
death, how much power should surrogates have?
This part focuses on the arguments put forth by courts, litigants, and
commentators regarding the amount of power surrogates should have to
overcome the expressed preferences of the never competent regarding end-
of-life medical decision making. Part II.A begins with the argument that
only a strong guardian can adequately protect the never competent's best
interests and prevent unnecessary suffering. Then Part II.B presents
arguments for limiting the authority of surrogates to override the expressed
194. Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act § 2, 9 U.L.A. 93-94.
195. Id. § 2(f).
196. Id. § 5. The order is spouse, adult child, parent, adult sibling, or "an adult who has
exhibited special care and concern for the patient, who is familiar with the patient's personal
values, and who is reasonably available." Id § 5(b), (c). Operators or employees of health
care institutions where an unrelated incompetent person lives cannot be agents under the act.
Id. § 5(i).
197. Id. § 5(f). The UHCDA does not outline what factors should go into a best interests
consideration, leaving that to the consideration of individual states. Id. § 2(e).
198. Id. § 5(g).
199. See Cantor, supra note 75, at 155-56.
200. See Dresser, supra note 71, at 636-37.
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preferences of never competents in end-of-life medical decisions out of
respect for their autonomy and to protect them from abuse.
A. The Strong Guardian Model
Advocates for a strong guardian model argue that the rights and interests
of the never competent can only be protected by a strong guardian.20
Furthermore, guardians are already bound to express the interests of the
ward; any expressed preferences of the ward are therefore taken into
account by a strong guardian.202 Also, it is entirely appropriate to hold the
expressions of wards to a higher standard of competence when they seek to
act against expert medical advice. 20 3 Finally, granting too much power to
the expressions of never-competent persons invites outside parties to
manipulate vulnerable persons into expressing preferences that are against
their best interests.204
1. The Necessity of Surrogate Action to Realize the Constitutional Rights
of Incompetent Patients
The strong guardian argument is premised on the never competent having
the same rights of patient autonomy that competent patients have, but
finding that those rights are meaningless unless exercised by a surrogate. 20 5
Limiting the powers of the guardian only serves to deny the ward the same
constitutional rights that formerly competent patients have. 20 6 While a
formerly competent patient can exercise her constitutional right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment by designating a proxy to make those
decisions, a never-competent patient never has the power to designate such
a proxy. 207  Limiting surrogate power can result in situations where
withholding medical treatment from a never-competent person is
impossible because she was never competent to refuse it.20 8 Proponents of
the strong guardian approach believe that the case of Sheila Pouliot20 9 and
201. See infra Part II.A.1.
202. See infra Part II.A.2.
203. See infra Part II.A.3.
204. See infra Part IL.A.4.
205. A major proponent of this reasoning is Norman Cantor, a law professor at Rutgers
University School of Law. See Cantor, supra note 63. Cantor also assisted the guardian's
attorney in Chantel R. Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Deny Petitioner the
Authority to Withhold or Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment at 1, In re Guardianship of
Chantel R., 791 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 2004) (No. 528/03) [hereinafter Cantor
Memo]; see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23 (1988) (stating in dicta
that rights have meaning when exercised by a surrogate).
206. See In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 449 (Wash. 1987); Cantor, supra
note 63, at 33-68; see also John H. Garvey, Freedom and Choice in Constitutional Law, 94
Harv. L. Rev. 1756 (1981).
207. See Cantor, supra note 75, at 158.
208. See Blouin v. Spitzer, 213 F. Supp. 2d 184, 192 (N.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd 356 F.3d
348, 359 (2d Cir. 2004) (interpreting New York law as refusing guardians the right to make
end-of-life decisions for the never competent).
209. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
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the state of the law in New York State prior to the passage of Surrogate's
Court Procedure Act section 1750(b) illustrate the harsh outcome when
medical treatment is forced upon a suffering patient.210 A guardian-focused
argument attempting to limit the power of guardians to make decisions only
violates the rights of their wards who may now be prevented from
exercising those rights. 211
2. A Guardian's Duties to a Ward: The Best Interest Doctrine
Under the strong guardian argument, the issue of unreasoned expressions
on the part of the never-competent ward is not a problem because the
guardian is bound to consider the statements of the ward.212 No new
judicial decision or statute is necessary as the guardian is required to
distinguish between reasoned and unreasoned expressions of the ward.213
The relationship between guardian and ward is one of loyalty; the guardian
is generally expected to honor the expressed wishes of the ward.214 It is the
guardian's responsibility to make the determination of the ward's best
interests, and any statements by the ward will be one factor among many
that are considered. 215
3. Assent and Dissent-The Importance of Following Medically Preferred
Courses of Action
Some argue that a more physician-centered approach is appropriate for
end-of-life medical decision making.216 Courts should accept the truth that
210. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text; see also Ouellette, supra note 17, at
18-21. Pouliot spent the last two months of her life curled in a fetal position, and her
physician believed she was in significant pain. According to her physician's progress notes,
hydration only allowed Pouliot to be kept alive for her body to "consume/eat itself." All of
this happened because, as a never-competent person, she could never prove she would not
wish this to happen to her. Id. at 16-17.
211. See In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 481 (N.J. 1981) ("We do not pretend that the
choice ... is her own choice. But it is a genuine choice nevertheless .... We believe that
having the choice made in her behalf produces a more just and compassionate result than
leaving Lee Ann with no way of exercising a constitutional right."); Norman L. Cantor, The
Relation Between Autonomy-Based Rights and Profoundly Mentally Disabled Persons, 13
Ann. Health L. 37, 56-57 (2004).
212. N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 1750-b(2)(c), (4) (McKinney Supp. 2006); see also N.Y.
Mental Hyg. Law § 81.20(a) (McKinney 1996) (requiring that (1) "a guardian shall exercise
the utmost care and diligence when acting on behalf of the incapacitated person; [and (2)] a
guardian shall exhibit the utmost degree of trust, loyalty and fidelity in relation to the
incapacitated person").
213. N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 1750-b(2)(c), (4); see also Cantor Memo, supra note 205,
at 16-17.
214. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 81.20(a)(3); 39 Am. Jur. 2d. Guardian & Ward § 1
(2004) ("A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person,
called a 'guardian,' acts for another, called the 'ward,' whom the law regards as incapable of
managing his or her own affairs.").
215. See Cantor Memo, supra note 205, at 17.
216. See Winick, supra note 34, at 43-44. Winick argues,
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competence decisions are essentially subjective: Decisions made by
individuals that are congruent to those preferred by physicians and
guardians are not generally tested for competence. 217 Unless there is gross
evidence of incompetence, a patient's capacity will not be challenged. 218
However, when an individual wishes to take an action that is against
medical advice, courts will hold him to the standard of informed consent
and probably attack his competency. 219 Physicians are not only ethically
bound to the best interests of their patients,220 but they are also in the best
position to evaluate these interests. 221 Therefore, it is appropriate to require
the expressed preferences of mentally retarded patients to meet a higher
standard of competency when they conflict with medical advice.222 When a
patient is never competent, a strong guardian can help ensure that decisions
are made based on the best medical advice.
4. Protecting the Never Competent from Manipulation
The strong guardian approach assumes that granting preference to the
statements of mentally retarded individuals who are adjudicated
incompetent exposes them to abuse and manipulation.2 23 A minimally
skilled interviewer can phrase a question to get a preferred answer from a
mentally retarded person. 224 Outside parties opposed to the guardian's
viewpoint may be able to interfere with important medical decisions.
Indeed, never-competent individuals typically live in inherently coercive
environments. 225 Giving the never competent's expressed answers legal
When the competing values at stake are respect for autonomy and a desire to act
in the best interests of the individual's health, the competency question should turn
on an assessment of the degree of autonomy present and the risk/benefit ratio of
the therapeutic intervention involved. Thus, while a patient should be allowed to
choose conventional treatment without demonstrating a high degree of
competency, a greater showing of competency is appropriate when the intervention
chosen is of questionable value and carries great risk.
Id.
217. Id. at 25-26; see also Milton D. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the
Unexpressed Major Premise, 53 Yale L.J. 271, 306-07 (1944) (suggesting that judges find
competence when the subject makes a decision they agree with and incompetence when the
subject makes the "wrong" decision).
218. See Winick, supra note 34, at 34.
219. See id.
220. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222 n.8 (1990).
221. See Winick, supra note 34, at 32.
222. See id. at 43-44.
223. Cantor Memo, supra note 205, at 17-18; see also Cantor, supra note 63, at 212 ("A
high potential exists for eliciting expressions from the patient-however
uncomprehending-that are favored by the surrogate decisionmaker or medical staff.");
President's Commission: Consent, supra note 39, at 67 (finding that even competent
patients can have their consent extracted by the skillful presentation of information by their
physician).
224. See Cantor Memo, supra note 205, at 17-18.
225. See James W. Ellis, Decisions by and for People with Mental Retardation:
Balancing Considerations of Autonomy and Protection, 37 Vill. L. Rev. 1779 (1992). Ellis
observes,
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weight may violate the responsibility of the state to protect them from
harm. 226
Furthermore, expressions of incompetent patients are often difficult to
interpret. 22 7  Expressions such as moaning, pulling at tubes, resisting
needles, and noncooperation with medical treatment may simply reflect
discomfort or confusion instead of opposition to treatment.228 The recent
Schiavo case is directly on point. 229  While the court and numerous
physicians found Terri Schiavo to be in a persistent vegetative state and
incapable of cognition, representatives of her parents, who objected to the
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration, interpreted many of her actions as
responses to their words and presence. 230 Evidence of this interpretation
People with mental retardation often believe, accurately for the most part, that, as a
practical matter, they must obtain "permission" from nondisabled individuals to do
things that no other adults in society must obtain permission to do. Both people
with mental retardation and nondisabled individuals who deal with them on a
regular basis assume that such authority is natural, necessary and appropriate.
Id. at 1802.
226. See id. at 1809; see also In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, 408 (Mich. 1995)
(describing parens patriae power as the state's obligation to protect defenseless individuals);
In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 479-80 (N.J. 1981).
227. Cantor, supra note 63, at 211.
228. Id.; see also Dresser, supra note 71, at 654-55 (discussing court interpretations of
noncooperative patients with mental disabilities). The dramatic variations in interpretation of
John Storar's behavior by the majority and dissent in In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.
1981), are instructive. The majority found that noncooperation was simply a product of
discomfort and that treatment "did not involve excessive pain" and following treatment he
returned to normal activity. Id. at 73. Judge Hugh Jones, in a dissenting opinion, found that
his condition, inoperable bladder cancer, carried tremendous pain generally and that
following the treatments he "ventured outside his room infrequently," and the transfusions
created frequent clotting in his urine making urination painful. Id. at 78 (Jones, J.,
dissenting).
229. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (M.D. Fla.), affd, 403 F.3d 1289 (1 1th
Cir.), stay denied, 125 S. Ct. 1722 (2005) (reviewing a request for injunction from
jurisdiction granted by Pub L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005)); see also In re Schiavo, No.
90-2908GD-003, 2000 WL 34546715 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Pinellas County Feb. 11, 2000), affd,
780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001), rev. denied, 789 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2001) (finding
that there was clear and convincing evidence from the original trial that Terri Schiavo would
decline life-sustaining treatment while in a persistent vegetative state).
230. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at Exhibit 7, Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289 (No. 05-
11556) (March 22, 2005, Declaration of Robert Schindler), available at
http://www.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/032205%20Schindlers%201 l%2OCir /o2OApp%20Exh
ibits.pdf. Robert Schindler, Terry Schiavo's father, observed,
5. For the first few days after the feeding tube was removed, Terri continued to
interact and respond to me with verbalizations and smiles. She continued to look
well.
6. In the early morning hours of March 21, 2005, immediately after Congress
passed a bill permitting Terri to protect her rights in federal court, Terri was still
looking relatively well. When I told Terri she would be soon taken out of the
hospice to have breakfast, she appeared to comprehend what I said and responded
to me with a smile.
Id. For a comprehensive timeline and collection of documents related to the Schiavo case,
see Kathy L. Cerminara & Kenneth W. Goodman, Key Events in the Case of Theresa Marie
Schiavo, available at http://www.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/timeline.htm (last visited Mar.
27, 2006).
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was circulated in the media through an edited videotape.231  The
expressions and statements of incompetent individuals are usually, by their
very nature, difficult or impossible to interpret.232  Therefore, never-
competent individuals must have a strong guardian to prevent manipulated
or poorly interpreted statements from disrupting the application of the
individual's best interests.
B. The Weak Guardian Model
The principle of patient autonomy underlying the jurisprudence of end-
of-life decision making may require that surrogates defer their decisions to
the expressed statements of patients, even if incompetent.
This section will look at three arguments for limiting the power of
surrogate decision makers to overcome the expressed intentions of never-
competent patients: a constitutional equal protection argument for treating
the statements of the never competent under the same standard as able-
bodied persons,233 the fundamental autonomy of the never competent,234
and case law rules on the standards necessary for terminating life sustaining
treatment and the presumption in favor of life.235
1. The Right of Incompetents to Equal Protection
Holding the statements of the never competent to the standard of
informed consent in situations where the same statements by the competent
or formerly competent would not be held to that standard violates the
principle of equal protection. 236 When a competent person executes an
advance directive indicating that he wants all measures taken to preserve his
life, no inquiry into the rationality of the statement is made.237 The level of
cognitive functioning necessary for informed consent is not a
requirement. 238 But when a never-competent person makes the same
statement, he is held to the standard of informed consent.239 Requiring
informed consent only from the mentally retarded (or other never-
competent patients) creates a different standard of decision making
involving a life and death decision.240
231. See Timothy E. Quill, Terri Schiavo-A Tragedy Compounded, 352 New Eng. J.
Med. 1630 (2005) (noting the misinterpretation of a patient in a persistent vegetative state
from a highly edited videotape).
232. See Cantor, supra note 63, at 211; Quill, supra note 231, at 1630.
233. See infra Part II.B.1.
234. See infra Part II.B.2.
235. See infra Part II.B.3.
236. Notice of Motion to Deny Petitioner the Authority to Withhold or Withdraw Life-
Sustaining Treatment at 10-11, In re Guardianship of Chantel R., 791 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Sur. Ct.
N.Y. County 2004) (No. 03-528) [hereinafter Chantel Notice of Motion].
237. See Chantel R., 791 N.Y.S.2d at 329.
238. See id. (finding that a competent person is free to make "emotional or irrational
decisions" concerning medical treatment).
239. See id.; Chantel Notice of Motion, supra note 236, at 10-11.
240. See Chantel Notice of Motion, supra note 236, at 11.
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Similarly, when an incompetent patient has an advance directive made
while competent, he is free to revoke it without the necessity of
competence. 241 Many state statutory schemes allow formerly competent
patients to revoke an advanced directive that would permit withholding
end-of-life treatment. 242 These statutes allow the revocations even by
persons adjudicated incompetent without having to prove their
competence. 243 The incompetent person must merely demonstrate a desire
for treatment.244 These statements are not held to the higher standard of
informed consent. 245
There is no rational basis for according the statements of a formerly
competent person less weight than a never-competent person. 246 Without
such a basis, dismissing a life-affirming expression by a never-competent
person based on the decision of a strong guardian violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 247
2. Greater Autonomy for Incompetent Persons and the Downside of
Surrogate Decision Making
Some argue for substantially more autonomy for the never competent. 248
There are substantial reasons for doubting the ability of surrogate decision
makers to ascertain the best interests of never-competent patients. The
emotional connections of family members can be a dangerous element for
241. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 31-36-5(c) (2001) (stating that agents cannot override a
patient's knowing decision, even if the patient has been adjudicated incompetent); In re
Guardianship of Ingram, 689 P.2d 1363, 1370 (Wash. 1984) ("[T]he ward's expressed
wishes must be given substantial weight, even if made while the ward is incompetent.");
Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act § 3(b) (1993), 9 U.L.A. 98 (2005) (indicating no explicit
competency requirement and no writing requirement for revocation of an advanced
directive).
242. See Thomas J. Marzen & Daniel Avila, Will the Real Michael Martin Please Speak
Up! Medical Decisionmaking for Questionably Competent Persons, 72 U. Det. Mercy L.
Rev. 833, 852-54 (1995) ("A majority of these laws permit an individual to revoke an
advanced directive refusing life-sustaining treatment even when the individual is not legally
competent and by means considerably less formal than those required to execute the advance
directive."); see also Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act § 3(b), 9 U.L.A. 98.
243. Unif. Rights of the Terminally Ill Act § 4(a) (1989), 9C U.L.A. 324 (2001) ("A
declarant may revoke a declaration at any time and in any manner, without regard to the
declarant's mental or physical condition. A revocation is effective upon its communication
to the attending physician or other health-care provider by the declarant or a witness to the
revocation."); Marzen & Avila, supra note 242, at 852 n.79 (citing the statutes of twenty-
eight states and the District of Columbia that expressly permit revocations by incompetent
patients).
244. Marzen & Avila, supra note 242, at 854.
245. See Ingram, 689 P.2d at 1371 ("[The] court need not place on any party any
particular burden of proof or persuasion.").
246. Chantel Notice of Motion, supra note 236, at 11; see also Francis S. v. Stone, 221
F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying an intermediate level of scrutiny to classifications
based on mental illness).
247. See Chantel Notice of Motion, supra note 236, at 11; see also Francis S., 221 F.3d at
111.
248. See Field & Sanchez, supra note 1; see also Martha A. Field, Killing "The
Handicapped"-Before and After Birth, 16 Harv. Women's L.J. 79 (1993).
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an incompetent person. 249 Also, able-bodied persons cannot understand the
subjective experience of the mentally disabled; the personal fears and
prejudices of the able-bodied often interfere with their decision making. 250
Surrogates or other actors with a vitalist ideology may force unwanted
treatment on a never-competent patient.251  How can an able-bodied
individual know what is in the best interests of a disabled one? 252
Applying a best interest analysis to incompetent persons is to impose
normative views on what constitutes quality of life.253 These views may
include concepts like "dignity" which have little meaning to the experience
of incompetent persons.254 Some suggest that best interest calculations
include the interests of third parties.255 A traditional best interest standard
is better left to situations involving financial matters where best interest
249. See James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, A Critique of Family Members as Proxy
Decisionmakers Without Legal Limits, 12 Issues L. & Med. 133, 143-46 (1996). Bopp
outlines several problems with family members as surrogate decision makers. "[T]here is no
generally applicable legal presumption that parents automatically become the
decisionmakers for their incompetent adult children." Id. at 140. "Emotional reactions such
as shock, denial, anger, and guilt .... may prove disastrous in the decision making
process." Id. at 143. Family members may feel resentful of the incompetent patient, they
may seek the quickest route free of an emotionally difficult situation, or they may insist on
inappropriate treatment out of feelings of guilt. Id. at 145-46. The incompetent may be a
drain on the financial and emotional resources of the family. Id. at 149. Bopp cites studies
which indicate that families are very poor predictors of the treatment preferences of their
relatives. Id. at 149-50. One study indicated that the predictions of doctors or family
members of an elderly individual's preference for a do-not-resuscitate order, "did not exceed
that of pure chance." Id. at 150 (quoting Dallas M. High, A New Myth About Families of
Older People?, 31 Gerontologist 611, 613 (1991)).
250. See Dresser, supra note 71, at 618-66 (arguing that individuals project their own
fears of death and disability onto incompetent patients).
251. See Ouellette, supra note 17; see also Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161
(M.D. Fla.), aff'd, 403 F.3d 1289 (11 th Cir.), stay denied, 125 S. Ct. 1722 (2005) (denying
the appeal of the family seeking to continue treatment despite a lower court finding that the
patient would not wish to be kept alive in a persistent vegetative state).
252. For a general discussion of what factors can (or should) go into a best interest
evaluation, see Cantor, supra note 75.
253. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 249, at 161 ("It is discriminatory for any person
other than a competent individual him- or herself to pass judgment on his or her quality of
life for the purpose of deciding whether or not that person should have medical treatment. If
such discrimination is done under color of state law against incompetent persons, it is likely
unconstitutional under the due process clause.").
254. See Dresser, supra note 71, at 659 ("[I]f relatively sophisticated concerns such as
dignity and privacy are deemed to justify nontreatment, then it seems that the vast majority
of mentally impaired patients' lives will be placed in jeopardy."); see also Field & Sanchez,
supra note 1. But see Cantor, supra note 75, at 171-75, 178 (arguing that the never
competent have intrinsic human dignity even if they could never ascertain it).
255. See Cantor, supra note 75, at 192-204 (suggesting that third-party needs can effect
medical decisions for incompetent patients in marginal cases, specifically in cases of
permanent unconsciousness); John Hardwig, The Problem of Proxies with Interests of Their
Own: Toward a Better Theory of Proxy Decisions, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 803, 809 (arguing that
family members' interests are defensible and that an exclusive patient-centered ethics should
be abandoned).
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calculations can be made. 256 The law should not apply the standard to
incompetent patients whose interests cannot be so easily measured. 25 7
3. The Presumption in Favor of Life: Applying End-of-Life Evidentiary
Standards to the Never Competent
Overriding a life-affirming statement by a never-competent person
substantially conflicts with case law at the national and state levels. 258
Numerous states and the Supreme Court have endorsed a clear and
convincing evidence standard for the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment. 259 It can therefore be inferred that any expression to the contrary
would make it difficult to reach the clear and convincing standard.260
Courts have also held that when evidence of intent is equivocal it is best to
err in favor of preserving life. 261
The surrogate's court in Chantel R. sought to get around this problem by
erasing Chantel's life-affirming statement by declaring her incompetent. 262
This creates a competence trap for the never-competent patient. 263 While
guardians may be obligated to take into account the wishes of their wards,
because the wards are adjudicated incompetent, their wishes have no
weight.264 This problem existed in R.H., where, because R.H. was
adjudicated incompetent, the court interviewed the guardian ad litem,
physicians, and family members, but never the incompetent ward herself.265
Any statement the ward makes that contradicts her best interests, as
perceived by the guardian, is simply further evidence of incompetence.2 66
The major criticism of the surrogate decision-making process made by
proponents of limiting that power is the arbitrary and often inappropriate
standards brought to best interests calculations. 267  Issues like dignity,
quality of life, and privacy are distinctly normative and very difficult for an
256. See Welch, supra note 38, at 1634-35.
257. See id But see Dresser, supra note 71, at 691-99. Dresser suggests that more can be
done to ascertain the experiential reality of incompetent patients, specifically patients with
dementia. "Although we must be careful and cautious, uncertainty about a patient's mental
experiences should not lead to their exclusion from the treatment calculation." Id. at 698.
258. See Chantel Notice of Motion, supra note 236, at 8-10; see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo.
Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1990); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (N.J.
1985); In re O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988).
259. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 286-87; Rasmussen ex rel. Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674,
691 (Ariz. 1987); In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 16 (Fla. 1990); O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at
613.
260. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 613 (holding that the proponent of ending treatment must
show that the preference for refusing treatment was strong enough to rebut any presumption
that the person would change her mind).
261. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 283; Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1231.




265. In re R.H., 622 N.E.2d 1071, 1077-78 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).
266. ChantelR., 791 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
267. See supra Part II.B.2.
2918 [Vol. 74
LISTENING TO THE DISABLED
able-bodied surrogate decision maker to accurately bring to bear on the
lived experience of the never competent. 268 While surrogate and guardian
statutes and case law often have clauses requiring guardians to ascertain the
preferences of the ward, these preferences are often erased by simply
asserting that because the preference is expressed incompetently, it should
be ignored. 269
In Part III this Note will attempt to synthesize the perspectives expressed
in Part II and focus on these ideas from the perspective of the individual
autonomy of the never competent.
III. GRANTING NEVER-COMPETENT PATIENTS FULL AUTONOMY THROUGH
GUARDIAN DECISION MAKING
This part argues that while a strong guardian is ultimately necessary to
protect the rights of never-competent persons, neither the strong guardian's
duty of loyalty nor the requirements to find the ward's best interests
adequately protect the fundamental autonomous rights of the never
competent to have their expressed preferences considered. Instead,
statutory language should require surrogates to begin their determination of
a never-competent patient's best interests with an evaluation of that
patient's expressed preferences. This patient-centered approach keeps the
strong guardian model's protection from indecision while maintaining the
safeguards for patient autonomy inherent in the weak guardian model.270
A. Fulfilling the Promise ofAutonomy Through a Patient-Centered
Approach
The analysis for determining end-of-life medical decisions for the never
competent should begin with evaluating the patient's preferences. Rather
than starting with a determination of the never-competent patient's best
interests, the surrogate must start by seeking evidence of the never-
competent patient's expressed preferences for treatment or nontreatment.
The surrogate can look to both verbal and nonverbal expressions such as
hostility to treatment or improved mood or activity following treatment. 271
If an expressed preference is ascertained, the surrogate can then compare
that preference with a best interest analysis.272 A surrogate should not be
able to override that preference unless there is clear evidence that no
reasonable person would choose that course of action. The surrogate
nevertheless retains the authority to make any decisions necessary for the
never-competent individual. 273
268. See supra Part II.B.2.
269. See supra Part I1.B.3.
270. Compare supra Part II.A with supra Part I.B.
271. See supra Part I.C.
272. See supra Part I.B.2.
273. See supra Part II.A. 1.
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The perspective on incompetence needs to shift. A finding of
incompetence is not a mechanism to erase the autonomy of the
incompetent. It is simply a finding that a person needs assistance in making
critical decisions. 274  Any expressed preference of a never-competent
patient should be the starting point of the inquiry into his best interests, not
just a stop along the way.275 If a patient's expressed preference is life
affirming, it is hard to see how his best interests can be served in denying
him treatment, irrespective of what a "reasonable person" would do in the
same situation.276 If a never-competent patient expresses a preference to
refuse life-sustaining treatment, then a surrogate should be able to make an
inquiry into whether a competent person in his situation could reasonably
make that choice. The surrogate, however, must make a serious attempt to
understand the never-competent individual's specific situation and his
expressed preferences. 277
This proposal grants verbal never-competent patients, such as Chantel R.,
real autonomy and favors their preferences regarding end-of-life medical
decisions rather than simply dismissing and silencing them.278 Courts that
examine cases such as R.H., where the decision to refuse treatment was
made without asking the preferences of the adult patient with Down's
Syndrome, should begin by asking about the patient's preferences. 279
While this patient-centered approach would not necessarily alter the
outcome of cases involving severely impaired nonverbal individuals such as
Saikewicz 280 or Storar, 281 it would force the courts to explicitly deal with
patients' expressed preferences in conducting their analysis. While severely
impaired individuals will often express annoyance at any medical
procedure, one can look to other actions in ascertaining their preferences for
or against treatment.282 Courts could look to life-affirming expressions
such as renewed energy following treatments and other measures of overall
well-being. 283
This patient-centered analysis may yield similar results to the strong
guardian approach, yet the tenor of the analysis will change. 284 The inquiry
274. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
275. Cf N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 1750-b(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2006) ("The guardian
shall base all advocacy and health care decision making solely and exclusively on the best
interests of the mentally retarded person and, when reasonably known or ascertainable with
reasonable diligence, on the mentally retarded person's wishes, including moral and
religious beliefs.").
276. See supra Part I.B.3.
277. See Dresser, supra note 71, at 698.
278. See In re Guardianship of Chantel R., 791 N.Y.S.2d 324, 329 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County
2004); supra Part I.
279. See In re R.H., 622 N.E.2d 1071, 1077 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993); supra Part I.
280. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass.
1977).
281. In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981).
282. Id. at 69; see supra Part I.C. 1
283. See Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 69.
284. See supra Part II.A.
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and the analysis centers on the expressed preferences of the patient whose
life is so profoundly affected by the surrogate's decision. This analysis will
offer dignity and respect to the never competent, and help their families and
guardians come to terms with their treatment. It also fully realizes the
principle of patient autonomy that is the basis of end-of-life medical
decision making for all persons, competent or not.285
Legislators need to bring the principles of patient autonomy to end-of-life
decision making for the never competent. This can only be done by making
the inquiry into any expressed preferences of the never competent the
starting point for the analysis of their best interests. The never competent
and their surrogates deserve to have their decisions afforded the consistent
application of legal principles.286 By making the never competents' wishes
the starting point for end-of-life medical decision making, legislators and
courts can fulfill the principle of patient autonomy for everyone. 287
B. The Patient-Centered Approach and the Strengths of the Weak
Guardian Model
The arguments for the weak guardian model support this proposal.288 By
focusing on the never competents' expressed preferences, the proposal
grants equal protection to never-competent persons by giving them a voice
in medical decision making. 289 When making end-of-life medical decisions
for formerly competent patients, surrogates must inquire into their
expressed preferences prior to incompetence. 290 Requiring an inquiry into
the preferences of the never competent grants them a similar voice in these
critical decisions.
By requiring surrogates to begin their analysis with a never competent's
expressed preference, a patient-centered approach addresses the problem of
surrogates whose interests diverge from those of the patients. 291 While the
problem cannot be entirely solved without stripping surrogates of the power
needed to fulfill the rights of never-competent individuals, 292 it does focus
the attention of the surrogate on the never competent's expression. This
will require the surrogate to focus on the subjective experience of the never
competent and discourage the imposition of the surrogate's normative
views. 293
Finally, by encouraging surrogates to respect any life-affirming
expressions by the never competent, the proposal conforms to the
presumption in favor of life found in the case law surrounding end-of-life
285. See supra Part I.A.
286. See supra Part I.B. 1.
287. See supra Part I.A.
288. See supra Part II.B.
289. See supra Part II.B. 1.
290. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1227 (N.J. 1985); supra Part l.A.
291. See supra Part II.B.2.
292. See supra Part II.A. 1.
293. See supra Part II.B.2.
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medical decisions. 294 When a never-competent individual, such as Chantel
R., 295 makes a life-affirming statement, this proposal would shift the burden
to the surrogate to argue that the preference is clearly irrational or
destructive. The life-affirming statements -of a never-competent individual
should not be held to the standard of informed consent. 296
C. The Patient-Centered Approach and the Strong Guardian Model
Requiring surrogates to begin their determination of a never-competent
patient's best interests with an evaluation of that patient's expressed
preferences fulfills the requirement for equal protection, patient autonomy,
and the presumption in favor of life suggested by arguments for the weak
guardian model. 297 At the same time, it does not contradict the argument
for a strong guardian: the fundamental need for surrogates to be
empowered to make all necessary decisions for the never competent. 298
Unlike the strong guardian model, the patient-centered approach puts the
expressed preferences of a patient before an objective analysis of a patient's
"best interest. 299
1. Benefits of a Strong Guardian: Avoiding the Curse of Indecision
The fundamental principle of patient autonomy must control both the
need for surrogate decision making as well as the limits of surrogates'
power.300 Current jurisprudence regarding end-of-life medical decision
making for formerly competent individuals is rooted in the idea that
individuals have a basic liberty interest in controlling their medical
treatment.30 1 Because this liberty interest comes from bodily integrity, it is
fully possessed by the never competent as well.30 2 But in order to exercise
this interest, a never-competent individual ultimately requires a surrogate to
effectuate his rights. 30 3 Therefore any statutory or common law principle
which ultimately limits what decisions surrogates can make on behalf of the
never competent violates their fundamental liberty interests.30 4
The tragic case of Sheila Pouliot provides a warning as to the ultimate
effect of arbitrary limits on the power of surrogates to make decisions on
294. See supra Part Il.B.3.
295. See In re Chantel R., 791 N.Y.S.2d 324, 329 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 2004); supra
Part II.B. 1.
296. See supra Part II.B.3.
297. See supra Part II.B.
298. See supra Part II.A. 1.
299. See supra Part II.A.2-4.
300. See supra Part I.A.
301. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990); supra Part
I.A.
302. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279; In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 449 (Wash.
1987).
303. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976).
304. See supra Part II.A. 1.
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behalf of the never competent. 305 In Pouliot's case, the New York Attorney
General indicated that life-sustaining medical treatment could never be
withdrawn from a never-competent patient because that patient would never
have been competent to express a preference for avoiding futile care. This
stance only extended the suffering of Pouliot beyond humane limits or
medical necessity.306 This can still happen in some states where the
burdens (such as requiring permanent unconsciousness) are high enough to
run the risk of having similar tragedies. 30 7 While courts have not gone so
far as to find a constitutional right to surrogate decision making,30 8 the
liberty interests of never-competent patients cannot be protected unless
surrogates have the power to make any decision necessary for the well-
being of their wards. 309
2. The Strong Guardian Model's Threat to Patient Autonomy
Beyond the never competent's fundamental interest in empowered
surrogate decision makers, the strong guardian model fails to adequately
protect the principle of patient autonomy for the never competent. 310
Surrogate decision makers must be compelled to take the expressed
preferences of the never competent as the starting point in their analysis of
the never competent's best interests.311 A patient-centered approach more
fully realizes the ideal of patient autonomy.312 Unlike the pre-HCDA
scheme in New York State-where surrogates did not have the power to
make end-of-life medical decisions because the wishes of the never
competent could not be ascertained to a legally recognized level-here,
surrogates should have that power.313 However, they must still base their
decisions on any expressed preferences of the never-competent patient.
Proponents of the strong guardian model argue that this is already the
case because guardians' duties to their wards require them to take into
account any expressions of the ward.314  But in practice, the never-
competent ward's expressed interests are ignored because his expressions
do not rise to the level of competence needed for informed consent. 315
Statutes and practice instead seek to separate out the never competent's
305. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
306. See Blouin v. Spitzer, 213 F. Supp. 2d 184, 186 (N.D.N.Y. 2002), affd 356 F.3d
348, 359 (2d Cir. 2004); Ouellette, supra note 17, at 13-2 1.
307. See Ouellette, supra note 17, at 21-29; supra Part I.D.
308. Blouin, 356 F.3d at 359.
309. See supra Part II.A. 1.
310. See supra Part ll.B.
311. See supra Part l.B.
312. See supra Part lI.B.
313. See Ouellette, supra note 17, at 13-21; supra Part 11.B.
314. See supra Part II.A.2.
315. See In re Guardianship of Chantel R., 791 N.Y.S.2d 324, 329 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County
2004); supra Part 1I.B. 1.
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expressed interests from their best interests, thereby silencing the
expressions of the never-competent individual.316
While the strong guardian model suggests that the best outcome can be
achieved by providing the medically preferred treatment, this is simply
another example of placing the best interest analysis before a patient's
expressed preferences. 317 The best interests of the never-competent person
cannot be the starting point of analysis for situations involving end-of-life
medical decisions. The best interest analysis works better in decisions
involving a financial impact or some readily measurable outcome. 318 End-
of-life medical decisions are typically emotional and normative in character,
weighing imponderable factors like the quality versus length of life. 319 The
question of whether or not to terminate life-sustaining treatment when one
is permanently unconscious, as in the Chantel R. case, 320 is not, ultimately,
a rational decision. Whether a permanently unconscious state is inherently
undignified is a normative question that is resistant to any kind of rational
analysis. 321 The only solution that comports with the principle of patient
autonomy in end-of-life medical decisions is to begin the analysis with the
expressed preferences of the never-competent patient and only turn to the
best interest analysis as a corrective for destructive decisions.
The strong guardian model also asserts that favoring the expressed
preferences of never-competent patients opens them up to the threat of
manipulation. 322 While that remains a possibility, the proposal seeks to
focus the attention of the surrogate on the subjective experience of the never
competent.323 Even though the proposal gives substantial weight to the
expressions of the never competent, it does not, ultimately, require the
surrogate to follow them.324
CONCLUSION
The state's power over incompetent individuals, and particularly never-
competent individuals, is ultimately for the incompetents' protection.
Merely being incompetent does not remove an individual's personhood or
legal rights. The difficulty lies in determining how to protect those rights,
particularly in the difficult decisions involved in end-of-life medical
decision making. The fundamental principle of personal autonomy
underlying doctrines surrounding medical decisions requires us to ask the
never competent for his preferences regarding treatment, even when those
316. See Chantel R., 791 N.Y.S.2d at 329; supra Part II.B.2.
317. See supra Part II.A.3.
318. See Welch, supra note 38, at 1634-35.
319. See supra Part II.B.2.
320. 791 N.Y.S.2d 324.
321. See supra Part II.B.2. But see Cantor, supra note 63 at 118-25 (arguing that
permanent unconsciousness is an intrinsically undignified state for any human being and
therefore individuals should have to actively choose to be maintained in that state).
322. See supra Part II.A.4.
323. See Dresser, supra note 71, at 698.
324. See supra Part II.A.1.
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preferences do not rise to the level of informed consent. Surrogate decision
makers may ultimately reject those preferences because they are totally
unreasonable, but by starting their analysis with those preferences we
recognize and affirm the status of never-competent persons as equal citizens
under the law.
Notes & Observations
